Humans: The Supernatural in Nature by Alexanian, Moorad
these Christians interpret a particular text, they perceive
science as anti-Scripture and anti-God.
In contrast, Reconciling the Bible and Science provides
a context for how both books of God should be embraced
by believers. It reveals how the philosophical contribu-
tions of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas underpin
modern science as well as religious concerns among cur-
rent creationists, the intelligent design movement (ID),
and theistic evolutionists (chaps. 1–2). The book then
traces the history of modern astronomy through Coperni-
cus, Galileo, and Newton (chap. 3) before focusing on
Charles Darwin and his successors in the field of biologi-
cal evolution, who have verified, corrected, and expanded
upon many aspects of his theory (chaps. 4–6).
The book proceeds to identify the roots of the current
debate between those fearful of science because of their
faith and those disdainful of religion on account of
science, effectively defining important terms such as
“falsifiable,” “theory,” and “myth.” The authors then trace
the more recent history of the controversy through the
court cases involving attempts by ID to place its curricu-
lum in public schools. While the authors agree that God
is the intelligent designer behind the universe, its great
age, expansion, and the evolution of its inhabitants, they
are not convinced that ID is science (p. 248). The authors
treat fairly both scientific creationists and ID with whom
they disagree, showing how some within those camps
have a nuanced acceptance of scientific discoveries, such
as the age of the universe, while still attempting to find
science in the Bible and to build upon it (chaps. 9–10).
Mitchell and Blackard reveal early on their stand with
theistic evolutionists, and then demonstrate why in Part II
(chaps. 11–14). Although they are sympathetic to Stephen
Jay Gould’s “non-overlapping magisteria,” they prefer
theistic evolution’s recognition of God as the creator who
works through evolution (p. 145). They believe the latter
involves more dialogue between “scriptural revelation
and the testimony of the created universe” (p. 149). They
boldly assert that biblical literalism “turns attention away
from the central religious concerns of the Bible’s authors.
Much religious language was not intended to be read liter-
ally …” (p. 172). Indeed, to expect the ancient Scriptures to
reveal or to be concordant with modern science is a
cheerless failure of the imagination.
Knowing when, where, and how the perceived science-
theology conflict arose and mutated is crucial to realizing
that the conflict does not have to be. Nonetheless, some
readers may find tedious the sheer length of material
leading to the discussion of biblical interpretation in
chapters 12–14. The material in chapter 12, which includes
the section “Reading the Bible for what it is,” could have
come much earlier in the book.
Also, the authors may have feared that further citations
would have made Reconciling the Bible and Science less
accessible, but readers would benefit by more of them,
as well as a short list of resources for further study at
the end of each chapter. For example, what is the textual
evidence for their claim that, at the beginning of the
seventeenth century, people began to see the Bible as
an infallible source of information about science, and that
the Bible had been “dictated” by God? (p. 49).
I have a few other quibbles. The authors repeat that
the purpose of the biblical creation stories is to oppose
polytheism (p. 25), but the accounts have other functions.
They are etiological; they explain the world as we see it—
farming, marriage, shame and modesty, the trials of
parenting, and adversarial relationships between spouses
and between brothers. Regarding the order of the Hebrew
Bible, the authors assume that Malachi is the last book
and that between Malachi and Matthew were “silent
years” (p. 23). Actually, Chronicles is the last book in the
Hebrew Bible and 400 BC to 0 were anything but silent
in terms of Jewish literature. Daniel was, in fact, written
during these years, and seemed for a time to reside in the
prophetic division. In addition, regarding the New Testa-
ment canon, Mitchell and Blackard claim that “Marcion
began the process,” but this gives him too much credit.
Scholars of the New Testament canon know that Marcion
created a canonical list around AD 140, but most of the
books of the New Testament were already being transmit-
ted as authoritative at that time, or else Marcion would
have had no books to excise from his list, even though, as
they note, a list identical to the present New Testament is
not found until the late fourth century.
All in all, I recommend this book to all who cannot
ignore the wonder of God’s universe as revealed through
science; who are convinced that Scripture permits us to
hear how our ancestors in the faith met God; and who
recognize that it is the means by which our walk with God
is illuminated.
Reviewed by Karen Strand Winslow, Azusa Pacific University, Azusa,
CA 91702. 
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Michael L. Peterson, “C. S. Lewis on Evolution and Intelli-
gent Design,” (PSCF 62, no. 4 [2010]: 253) presents a com-
prehensive study of C. S. Lewis on the theory of evolution,
the argument from intelligent design, and how Lewis
would distinguish the philosophical arguments for a Tran-
scendent Mind from the current claims of the intelligent
design (ID) movement.
The central issue in all arguments and discussions
regarding the scope of science is based on the distinction
between the notions of methodological naturalism in sci-
ence from those of philosophical naturalism. Methodo-
logical naturalism is the scientific approach of restricting
the explanation of natural phenomena to natural causes.
Philosophical naturalism, on the other hand, is the meta-
physical view that nature alone is real, that the super-
natural does not exist. However, it is not often clear
what one means by “natural phenomena” and “natural
causes.” For instance, is human reasoning a natural
phenomenon based on natural causes? Lewis considers
human reasoning to be supernatural.1 Therefore, it seems
that methodological naturalism presupposes physicalism,
which can only deal with the physical aspect of human
beings, and so can never give a complete description of
what a human being is.
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Note that physicalism implies that purely physical
devices can collect, in principle, all the data that form the
assumed reality. Therefore, methodological naturalism
equates the real with the physical. Of course, what is real
ought to be the totality of all that can be “detected”
directly by human beings together with data collected
with the aid of purely physical devices, the latter data
encompassing only the subject matter of science and not
the whole of reality.
In evolutionary theory, one applies the results of the
experimental sciences to construct a temporal develop-
ment, connecting cosmic evolution and biological evolu-
tion supporting the appearance of human beings. How-
ever, it is hard to understand how Lewis would subscribe
to such a theory that leaves out the true essence of human
beings, namely, their ability to “detect” God, which is
Lewis’s “argument from reason.” The “detection” is based
on the supernatural nature of human reasoning in which
the inferior supernatural being “detects” the infinitely
superior supernatural Being. Purely physical devices can-
not accomplish that. Accordingly, one can do experimen-
tal science and develop theories summarizing the data
without invoking God; however, the true nature of
humans, who are the doers of science, will remain hidden
from studies that assume methodological naturalism.
Peterson indicates, “ID views itself as reviving and
updating the eighteenth-century argument for God which
assumes that science can discover traces of a designing
intelligence in the natural world” (p. 256). The enterprise
of science involves using collected physical data together
with prior information that allows humans to make
Bayesian inferences. Of course, if one begins with physical
data, then such inferences relate to the physical aspect
of reality only and not to the supernatural aspect.
The whole of reality, that is nature, involves, in addition
to the purely physical data, nonphysical data “detected”
by humans. Note that human (supernatural) reasoning
is used to make scientific inferences from purely physical
data, that is, the doing of science itself requires the
supernatural.
It is clear that attempts to answer questions of what
constitutes nature must be based on the kinds of knowl-
edge one uses to make sense of the whole of reality.
William Oliver Martin characterizes kinds of knowledge
as being autonomous or synthetic.2 The latter are reducible
to two or more of the autonomous (or irreducible) kinds
of knowledge. Martin considers six autonomous kinds of
knowledge: history (H), metaphysics (Meta), theology (T),
formal logic (FL), mathematics (Math), and generaliza-
tions of experimental science (G). Metaphysics and theol-
ogy constitute two domains of the ontological context.
Martin indicates the role that autonomous kinds of knowl-
edge play in synthetic kinds of knowledge, namely, in-
strumental, constitutive, and/or regulative. For instance,
historical propositions are constitutive of G, metaphysical
propositions are regulative of G, and propositions in for-
mal logic and mathematics are instrumental to G. Theo-
logical propositions are not related to G.
Notes
1C. S. Lewis, Miracles (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971),
Appendix A.
2William Oliver Martin, The Order and Integration of Knowledge
(Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1957).
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Mihretu P. Guta accuses me of neuroscientism, claiming
that I assert that the proper knowledge of human nature
is only attainable via neuroscience (PSCF 63, no. 1 [2011]:
69–70). This was most certainly not the intention of my
article (“Peering into People’s Brains,” PSCF 62, no. 2
[2010]: 122–32), and I am surprised that he considers this
to be my position. More importantly though, we cannot
dismiss neuroscience and the role of the brain in human
life as readily as Guta does. The thrust of the develop-
ments outlined in my article is that neuroscience, in some
circumstances, is beginning to claim that it can provide
something akin to first-person descriptions. The adequacy
of these is a matter for debate, and I questioned some of
the claims.
However, Guta’s example of the hurtfulness of pain is
not entirely convincing. I readily accept that neuroscience
can tell us only a limited amount about how I (or someone
else) experience pain. Nevertheless, when sitting in the
dentist’s chair, it is comforting to know that the dentist
has an intimate knowledge of nerves such as the inferior
alveolar, when injecting an anaesthetic into the appropri-
ate one prior to working on my tooth. Pain is objective,
regardless of whether my experience is slightly different
from yours, and neuroscience is indispensable in under-
standing some aspects of it and controlling it, at least to a
degree.
The dramatic, and sometimes appalling, pathologies
that result from brain injuries or drug-based manipula-
tions of the brain, show that the gulf between first- and
third-person descriptions can become exceedingly murky
and ill defined. Whether we like it or not, neuroscientists
can peer into ever more intimate aspects of our thought
life, and on occasion, can even manipulate it. Christians
should not close their eyes to what is going on all around
them in neuroscience laboratories.
Similarly, my description of the color “blue” may or
may not be the same as someone else’s, but this does not
make redundant attempts to determine which parts of the
visual cortex are responsible for the perception of color.
There is a powerful personal element to all our conscious
responses and reactions, but this in no way invalidates the
point I made in my article about the centrality of the brain
(and other parts of the nervous system) for many facets of
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